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Abstract
The liberalization of services that were formerly 
organised as monopolies implies threats and oppor-
tunities. On one hand, income inequality and the 
existence of rural areas where access to communica-
tions is difficult usually imply that rural population 
experiment difficulties when access to a network faci-
lity. This is a consequence of large sunk costs (which 
strongly depends on geography) and low service 
affordability (which is positively correlated with 
gross domestic product per capita). On the other 
hand, liberalisation should yields to better prices and 
access to a number of telecoms services.  We present 
a model in which consumers’ capacity to access 
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broadband Internet facilities is negatively correlated 
with the price charged by the network owner per 
consumption capacity unit. We motivate the model 
by analyzing the Latin America telecommunication 
market. In the reference scenario, a vertically integra-
ted monopoly operates in both the network and the 
service provision market. In the liberalized scenario, 
we assume duopolistic competition in the service 
provision market between the network owner and a 
potential entrant firm. We find that network capacity 
may be maximal depending on the regulation sche-
me. Accordingly, there is a trade-off between network 
capacity and retail prices. Moreover, the liberalized 
structure does not necessarily enhance consumer 
surplus. Finally, either excessive differentiation or 
a low network capacity may reduce social welfare 
under the liberalized environment.
Keywords: Telecommunications markets, Liberalisa-
tion, Latin American Countries, Regulation
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Introduction
Internet has been adopted all over the world at an 
amazing speed. Using the International Communica-
tion Union´s data  for Latin America and the Carib-
bean, we can see that Internet users were close to zero 
in 1990 but in 2007 they represented 25.7 percent of 
the total population. In fact, Internet access is now a 
part of daily life, at least in urban areas in developed 
countries. Latin America has joined the Internet 
revolution later than most developed areas. However, 
we can find a positive aspect in the delayed introduc-
tion to the Internet revolution: Latin America can 
take advantage of already existing innovations and 
with lower costs. 
However, Latin America´s innovation and produc-
tive structures are not dynamic and its human capital 
is insufficient.  Information and communication 
technologies (ICT, hereafter) represent the way to 
foster productivity and create opportunities for 
sustainable economic growth and employment. ICT 
reduce transaction costs, speed information flows 
and they allow for higher technology diffusion and 
human capital development. ICT can also improve 
public services and promote more responsible and 
efficient governments. The ICT4D concept (ICT for 
development) supported by the United Nations and 
other international development partners appear 
as a useful platform for development, but for doing 
that the role of investment is essential. In fact, the 
greater the willingness to invest the larger will be the 
response to new technology and the greater will be 
the adoption of the Internet. 1
Moreover, public institutions play an important role 
in innovation by means of design and the imple-
mentation of policies at national or regional level, in 
particular in rural and remote areas. To achieve the 
goal of access for all, telecommunication infrastruc-
ture must be expanded and public support is required 
for telecommunication companies to promote invest-
ment in rural and remote areas. Thanks to joint 
actions, ITC can reach those groups that otherwise 
would remain excluded from the information and 
knowledge society.
In developing countries, a stylized fact is the exist-
1 The willingness to invest is affected by many factors, 
among others, income level, infrastructure levels, access to credit, 
educational level and economic openness.
ence of high income inequality jointly with a low 
gross domestic product (GDP, hereinafter) per capita. 
Moreover, it is well know that in rural areas it may be 
difficult to access a network facility. This is because 
low service affordability, combined with large sunk 
investment costs (necessary to provide broadband 
Internet access by a service provider), leads to lack of 
broadband Internet access for the entire population2 
as it has been pointed out by international institutions 
such as the United Nations and CEPAL 3. Firms try to 
pass on these investment costs to consumers in order 
to recover part of them. The main reason for which 
telecommunications are often regulated by the state 
relates to the special characteristics of the supply and 
demand structures and overall market organization. 
Historically, service provision has been undertaken 
by a natural monopolist who is also the network 
operator. In this case, the role of regulation has been 
to ensure that the monopolist behaves in accordance 
with the public interest, avoiding possible abuses of 
monopoly power. The main economic argument for 
this market structure is that a single operator would 
be able to provide services at lower rates and with a 
wider coverage than a market served by a number of 
smaller scale competitive operators. In fact, a single 
operator is in a better position to dimension and plan 
the construction of a network (technical efficiency) 
and to avoid unnecessary investments and excess 
capacity. Thereby, economies of scale can better 
ensure compatibility of all parts of the network, and 
technical and administrative costs related to network 
integration and interconnection can be minimized.
This monopolistic setup has proved to be rather inef-
ficient in accommodating sharp demand increases. 
Moreover, the requirements for broadband Internet 
access and the desirability of universal service provi-
sion of this facility jointly with the traditional voice 
telephone service have collapsed the old telecommu-
nications structures in almost all developing coun-
tries. Free and open competition benefits individual 
consumers by ensuring lower prices, and offering 
new and better products and services in comparison 
with monopoly conditions. In order to achieve the 
2 The telecommunications sector is capital-intensive, 
characterized by large sunk investments necessary to set up a 
network
3 See United Nations (2009). MGD Task Force Report 
2009: Millennium Development Goal 8: Strengthening the Goal 
Partnership for Development in a Time of Crisis; and CEPAL 
(2009) Information and Communication for Development Report 
(IC4D 2009). Extending Reach and increasing impact.
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In this paper we set up a model with a unique network 
owned by an incumbent operator. The network 
capacity is determined by an access price fixed by 
the network owner which determines the consumer’s 
consumption capacity (the network capacity) along 
the service characteristics space. A central feature 
of our analysis is the fact that the network provision 
market is less competitive than the service provision 
one due to the institutional history and the size of 
sunk costs necessary to set up the network infra-
structure. Once network capacity is determined, the 
incumbent and an entrant firm engage in the provi-
sion of the final service. Consumer heterogeneity 
captures consumers’ differing degrees of affordability 
to join the service. The entrant’s connection fee is 
determined by the regulator. In this environment, we 
study, i) the relation between service competition, 
network access pricing, and the level of connection 
fee when endogenous network capacity is assumed, 
ii) the efficiency of the resulting market depending 
on the overall capacities and market split among the 
providers of the final service, and iii) the degree of 
differentiation between service providers in compari-
son to the socially optimal one.
The literature on markets served by a network has 
paid special attention to suppliers’ ability to apply 
nonlinear pricing schemes. Trillas and Calzada (2005) 
revise regulatory pricing schemes by country in the 
case of both one-way and two-way interconnection. 
They found that many countries experience legal 
and institutional barriers to apply regulatory recom-
mendations made by theorists, in particular the cost-
based approach and its efficiency. Concerning the 
literature on one-way access, De Bijl and Peitz (2006) 
have explored the nature of local loop unbundling 
when there is full consumer participation; that is, 
when total demand is perfectly inelastic with respect 
to retail price changes. In the same paper, they also 
analyze partial consumer participation. They found 
that, with full participation, unbundling require-
ments are neutral to competition: they do not affect 
the entrant’s profit and market share. Indeed, this is 
a generalization of early results reported in De Bijl 
and Peitz (2002) studying a number of issues related 
to one-way and two-way interconnection problems 
in-depth, in the context of an asymmetric oligopoly 
and with a number of regulatory mechanisms and 
competition rules. In their paper they also found that 
access regulation is typically appropriate in the early 
stages of competition, when entrants have not yet 
installed alternative infrastructures. We use here the 
benefits of competition described above, govern-
ments and regulators must establish an appropriate 
regulatory framework for the telecommunications 
sector. In this sector, achieving perfect competition is 
difficult if not impossible because in most areas there 
is typically only one network supplier. Therefore, it 
may be very difficult for new suppliers to enter into 
the market due to larger investment (sunk) costs and 
institutional or technical barriers to entry. The latter 
may include economies of scale and economies of 
scope. Furthermore, economies of vertical integra-
tion beyond the network are usually large in telecom-
munication markets. Then, in many cases new opera-
tors provide final services accessing the local loop of 
the incumbent’s network. This is the case addressed 
in the literature on one-way access 4. 
In the telecommunications industry, a consumer’s 
connection to the network depends on the network 
owner’s decision to provide the service in a given 
region (location). Moreover, the capacity of the 
available network determines the customer’s capac-
ity to access telecommunication services. Usually, 
incumbent operator (network owner) can provide 
Internet access by narrow band (by dial-up telephone 
connection) or by broadband band through a DSL 
(Digital Subscriber Line) technology. In the latter, 
the network owner may decide the capacity avail-
able at each price. Depending on the cost of differ-
ent connection alternatives, users may subscribe to 
a superior Internet connection enhancing Internet 
access speed. This means they can access the Internet 
services (perform searches, download pages, upload 
files, etc.) they desire within the time they have avail-
able to spend online.  The physical wire connection 
between a customer and the company is known as 
a local loop, and it is owned by the incumbent local 
exchange firm.  Accessing the local loop requires a 
regulatory process known as local loop unbundling. 
It allows multiple telecommunications operators to 
use connections from a telephone exchange’s central 
office to serve customers 5.  
4 For a detailed review of one- and two-way access and 
the pricing rules used in telecommunications markets see Vogel-
sang (2003).
5 The general Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS) 
within the framework of WTO telecommunications law require 
unbundling of the local loop to give access to new entrants (section 
5ª of the GATS Annex on Telecommunications). See http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_e.htm for 
more information (28/09/2009).
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competitive free market approach. In fact, Chile has 
a liberalised fixed-line market with several operators 
providing fixed telephony in competition with the 
incumbent Telefónica Chile. In the broadband sector, 
Chile’s Internet and broadband penetration rates are 
the highest in South America. As in Chile, Argen-
tina’s telecom market is one of the most advanced in 
Latin America. Two regional incumbents, Telefónica 
de Argentina and Telecom Argentina, dominate the 
local fixed line market. Concerning the broadband 
market, it is divided fairly equally between three play-
ers: Telefónica de Argentina, Telecom Argentina, and 
Grupo Clarín. Competition has driven prices down 
so that broadband is cheaper in Argentina than in 
other Latin American countries.
Brazil is one of the key emerging markets, with a tele-
com sector that has been fully liberalised. The incum-
bents in the fixed-line market are still the infrastruc-
ture leaders but they are losing market share at a slow 
rate in benefit of the smaller operators. Meanwhile, 
broadband uptake has been stifled by high prices and 
weak competition. In this wave of emerging markets, 
Venezuela is a country with high telecom growth 
potential. State-owned CANTV has been undertak-
ing social programs for disadvantaged groups in the 
population. As in Brazil case, Venezuela’s broadband 
penetration is lower than the Latin American aver-
age. CANTV dominates the market with its ADSL 
service and lack of competition has made ADSL quite 
expensive compared with neighbouring countries, 
and the speed is slow.
Uruguay’s local fixed line market has achieved 
the second highest teledensity in Latin America 
after Costa Rica. Moreover, mobile telephony and 
broadband internet access have been the fastest 
growing telecom sectors. Uruguay is one of the few 
countries in the world where broadband access via 
cable modem is forbidden. In the case of Peru, the 
government promotes digital possibilities through 
FITEL, a fund that finances rural operators under the 
rule of less-bid subsidy. The local telephony market 
is still dominated by the incumbent Telefónica del 
Perú. Internet user penetration is remarkably high 
compared with Peru’s other economic indicators. 
The success of the Internet in Peru is primarily due to 
the mushrooming of cheap public Internet facilities 
known as cabinas públicas. In fact, Peru is a world 
leader in terms of users who access the Internet in 
public places. 
main elements of their basic one-way model to study 
the capacity interconnection regime and the non-
linear tariff schemes that arise. Previous studies on 
one-way access have focused on the optimal second-
best pricing (Ramsey pricing) in a context of homoge-
neous and differentiated services with a competitive 
fringe. The literature has also considered access price 
rules for given retail prices, paying special attention 
to the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). 
Both strands are thoroughly analyzed in Armstrong 
(2002), discussing the interaction between competi-
tion and regulation in telecommunications markets. 
He shows that because of the incumbent’s monopoly 
position in the access market, monopolists often set 
access charges too high 6. Finally, Laffont and Tirole 
(1994) have analyzed Ramsey prices and other pric-
ing formulas to find optimal regulation.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides a descriptive analysis of 
the situation in Latin America. Section 3 develops 
and solves the natural monopoly model and section 4 
extends the model by solving the liberalized industry 
configuration. Section 5 discusses the main results 
and welfare implications. Section 6 presents conclu-
sions and gives policy implications. 
Motivation and descriptive analysis
In this section we highlight the current situation in 
the Latin America telecoms market and we provide 
some statistical evidence to motivate the theo-
retical model 7. In general, the telecoms market has 
experimented huge growth in the last decade in Latin 
America region. However, there are some important 
differences between countries due to different stages 
of development. In particular, GDP per capita, the 
existence of isolated rural areas and the grade of 
liberalization and regulation yield different environ-
ments depending on the country considered as we 
show in the following paragraphs.
Chile is often portrayed as a role model by the 
international business community for its adop-
tion of progressive social policies together with a 
6 For a broad discussion see also Laffont and Tirole 
(2000) and Vogelsang (2003).
7 This market includes the countries of Argentina, Boli-
via, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela.
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customer experiments to access telephone fixed lines 
and broadband lines8. Then, the larger the rural popu-
lation the higher the transportation cost t. Finally, as 
the maximum global price R that a customer is will-
ing to pay for the service we use the GDP per capita 
(2006). We also explicitly emphasise that individual 
preferences play an important role, unless they are 
unobservable. Thus, our proxy variables are defined 
as follows,
Table 1 below shows the GDP per capita of the ten 
Latin American countries as well as R, r and p. Table 
2 shows the current situation in these countries 
concerning the telecom market. In the case that an 
historic firm (former natural monopoly) has signifi-
cant market power it is an incumbent. The fringe is 
the number of firms that act as followers. In the case 
that a fringe is formed by a reduced number of firms 
we use few. When there is fair competition we use 
large.
Table 1. Descriptive statistic analysis.
Data 2006. Source: UN, ITU and own construction. * 
Magnitudes in US$.
8 Notice that broadband access is usually offered to 
subscribers of fixed telephone lines as an extra service. This is the 
reason an extra access fee of p is paid.
Colombia has around 30 local telephone providers, 
partly private and partly owned by the municipali-
ties where they operate. The incumbent, Colombia 
Telecom, has been taken over by Telefónica and 
renamed Telefónica Telecom. The basic telephony 
market is stagnant, and broadband penetration is 
only slightly below average for Latin America and it 
has been growing at an impressive rate. In the same 
way, Ecuador’s fixed-line penetration is consider-
ably behind other Latin American countries, but the 
new incumbent CNT, created from the merger of 
state-owned Andinatel and Pacifictel, has ambitious 
plans to raise it from 14 percent in 2008 to 19 percent 
in 2010. CNT also plans to boost the country’s low 
broadband penetration by increasing coverage and 
reducing prices. The main broadband technology is 
cable modem, but ADSL is on the rise. 
Paraguay has experimented problems with the devel-
opment of telecoms markets. In fact, Paraguay is one 
of the poorest and least developed Latin American 
nations. This scenario derives in a poorly developed 
telecom system. Despite repeated attempts at privati-
sation and liberalisation, the fixed-line sector remains 
a state-owned monopoly until 2009. In March 2009, 
the wholesale Internet market was liberalised, and 
Copaco lost its monopoly over the international 
backbone for Internet connectivity. Finally, Bolivia’s 
fixed-line market is open to competition, with several 
cooperatives and private companies offering local 
and long-distance telephony services. ADSL technol-
ogy is available in Bolivia although the broadband 
market is still embryonic. 
Descriptive analysis
We show here some variables to motivate the 
theoretical model. First, we use some dummies in 
order to approximate retail and access prices that a 
customer must pay to access Internet facilities. In our 
model, we suppose that a given customer may access 
Internet facilities by either a fixed telephone dial-up 
(narrow band) or broadband line. In the first case, 
he pays the retail price r whereas r+p is paid in the 
case of broadband access. Broadband access is offered 
by a local loop which is traditionally owned by the 
network fixed line operator. Then, in the case of 
liberalization of the service provision it is unbundled 
in order to give access to entrant firms. We use 2006 
data of monthly telephone subscriptions as a dummy 
for r and telephone connection fees as a dummy for 
p. Moreover, we use the ratio of rural population 
over urban population as dummy of the cost t that a 
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita - Nikolaos Georgantzís
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service is offered to all customers. Thus, in our model 
we are interested in the intensity (i.e, the network 
capacity) of the broadband connection. 
Benchmark: a natural monopoly
We consider a telecommunications market where a 
firm labelled M is the owner of the network infras-
tructure to provide telecommunications services 
(dial-up fixed telephony and broadband Internet 
access) to a fixed population of users. Consumers’ 
affordability differences to join the service are repre-
sented by a spatial model à la Hotelling (1929) where 
consumers are uniformly distributed along the unit 
interval with a constant density D. Let D represent 
the broadband network capacity resulting from a 
consumer’s installed capacity decision. We assume 
that D inversely depends on an access price p charged 
by the network owner, as implied by D=1-p . The 
resulting capacity available to customers is offered at 
a constant unit cost kє[0,1].
As a benchmark case, we consider that M is also the 
monopolist in the service provision market, incurring 
a constant marginal cost cM, so this firm is a vertically 
integrated network. We assume throughout the paper 
that service suppliers are obliged to provide universal 
service, although the network capacity is determined 
by consumer’s affordability. The timing is as follows: 
after having charged a connection fee p for the capa-
city installed, M chooses the location (type of service, 
hereafter) at the second stage; then, at the third stage 
M sets a retail price rM per unit of service consumed. 
When the model is extended to allow competition in 
the service provision market, customers may connect 
to firm E, which pays an access fee to M in order to 
get access to the network. Figure 1 below describes 
these market structures.
Figure 1. Market structures: monopoly and liberalized 
service provision.
The intuition behind these types of structures is that a 
Table 2. Service providers and liberalization, 2009.
Source: own construction.
We estimate the number of Internet users by mean 
of two regressions. First, we use the following macro 
variables: GDP per capita and the inverse of the ratio 
rural over urban population (t 1),
We estimate the equation by OLS yielding,
Internet_users = - 103739 + 0,000015 GDP + 0,166 Urban_pop
   (0.022) (0.002)
with an adjusted R-Square of 99.5 percent. Second, 
we calculate the number of Internet users by means 
of the following micro variables: number of Internet 
subscribers who use dial-up connections (ISUBS-
dial_up), and the number of Internet subscribers who 
use DSL connections (ISUBSDSL), 
We estimate the equation by OLS yielding,
Internet_users = 425929 + 2,50 ISUBS dial-up + 8,96 ISUBS_DSL
                                             ( 0.012 )                       (0.003)
with adjusted R-Square of 99.1 percent 9. In both 
regressions parameters are significant so Internet 
users are well approximated, at macro and micro 
levels.
In the next section we develop a model in which 
Internet is accessed by DSL. We assume that dial-up 
9  In parenthesis p-values. Both regressions fitted at 95 
percent confidence.
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πM*=R-cM-k-t/4
Therefore, as expected, the monopolist's equilibrium 
profits positively depend on the consumer's maximal 
affordability for the service, and negatively on the 
marginal costs as well as on service and transpor-
tation costs as measured by the coefficient t. Notice 
that cost parameters cM and k have a greater impact 
on the monopolist's maximal profit than does the 
heterogeneity of consumers measured by t, because 
all demand is automatically captured by M.
The solution coincides with the implementation of 
the socially optimal monopoly location and access 
pricing scheme, as it maximizes the network capaci-
ty. However, this should not be the best solution for 
the consumer, given that the transfer of rM from the 
consumer to the network monopolist is not taken 
into account. Given that there are infinite pricing 
schemes involving different levels of consumer 
surplus, all of which would lead to the same level of 
aggregate welfare, it should be a task undertaken by 
the regulator to split this aggregate welfare in a proper 
way to encourage consumer surplus. In fact, there is 
a trade-off between the monopolist's profitability and 
consumer surplus. More specifically, when rM*=cM+k 
the monopolist's profits are minimized with πM*=0 
and consumer surplus is maximal. This, then, implies 
the possibility for a continuum of regulation schemes 
yielding maximal total social welfare, depending on 
the regulator's target and the subsequent decision on 
the implemented rMє{cM+k,R-t/4}. We develop this 
idea in the next section.
Competition in service provision
We now extend the environment to set up a model 
in which a new entrant, E, competes in prices with 
M in the service provision market setting rE and 
facing marginal costs cE. The new entrant E owns a 
backbone and switches, and needs to connect to the 
incumbent firm's local loop to access the network. 
Then, in addition of marginal costs cE related to the 
provision of the service, the entrant has to pay the 
network owner a connection fee α per unit of service 
it provides to its clients. We suppose that the regula-
tor sets α exogenously12. In this sense, our framework 
is one of one-way access where the entrant needs to 
connect to the network in order to supply the service. 
12 As the entrant's connection fee is exogenously given by 
the regulatory authorities, we consider α as a model parameter.
monopolist offer a basic telecom service as occurs in 
early stages of telecoms markets. In contrast to this, 
when the service is liberalized, an increase in consu-
mer affordability is revealed with different consumer 
profiles.
The tariff structure is T(p,rM)=p+rM  where the first 
part determines the network capacity and the second 
extracts surplus from a fixed population of consu-
mers. Given p and the resulting network capacity D, 
each consumer is assumed to have a unit demand for 
the service which yields her a utility of 
U=D·(R-p-rM-t(lM-x)2)-D·p
where R is a reservation price for the service, lM is 
the monopolist's type of service, x is the user's ideal 
service (given her affordability for it) on the interval 
[0,1] and (lM-x)2 is a term capturing the quadratic 
utility loss experienced by the user due to the distance 
between her ideal service and that actually provided 
to her by M10. Using the universal service provision 
assumption, the monopolist's profit is given by:
πM=D·[(p-k)+(rM-cM)] (1)
where the first part specifies the network mark-up 
and the second part the service mark-up. Then, the 
following holds:
Proposition 1 (Monopoly outcome)11: A network 
monopolist M operating under the restriction of 
universal service provision locates in the middle of 
the segment lM*=1/2 charging an access price of p*=0 
yielding maximal density D*=1 and a retail price for 
the provision of the service equal to rM*=R-t/4.
Proposition 1 implies that unlike having induced 
maximal network density (setting the capacity access 
price equal to zero) a monopolist extracts the maxi-
mum possible surplus. Moreover, minimizing distan-
ce from the consumers located on the extremes of 
the [0,1] interval (which have the minimum service 
affordability). Substituting the equilibrium magnitu-
des presented in Proposition 1 into the monopolist's 
profit function (1) we get:
10 This is a special case of quasi-linear preferences with 
full customer participation. For a more general model see Bijl and 
Peitz (2004).
11 All propositions’ proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
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is charged to the consumers yielding a network capa-
city         Then, Nash equilibrium retail prices for the 
provision of the service are given by  with   and  
The solution described in Proposition 2 accounts for 
the fact that the network owner's profit is affected 
less than in the usual spatial competition model by 
its rival's sales, given that the latter pays the former 
a connection fee of α per unit of service provided. 
The equilibrium in retail prices is symmetric and the 
effect of the per service unit transfer α from E to M 
has a positive, direct impact on retail prices of both 
service suppliers, ∂ rˆ i /∂ α=1,i=M,E. This result lies 
on the line of previous results (see for instance De 
Bijl and Peitz 2006). An interesting property of the 
model is that the connection fee has a direct impact 
on the network density. Explicitly, the higher the 
connection fee , the larger the network density fixed 
by the incumbent:
This suggests that regulators can implement α to 
achieve different targets: maximize the network capa-
city (but at high retail prices) or provide cheap DSL 
connections with a moderate network capacity. This 
issue is especially relevant in the case of developing 
countries where consumers’ affordability is reduced.
Substituting retail prices and the equilibrium price 
into the profit functions for the incumbent and the 
entrant firm we obtain,
,and
respectively. These expressions show that in our 
framework not only M's equilibrium profits are 
(positively) affected by α. In fact, for the entrant, an 
increase in retail prices due to α has a direct effect 
on the entrant's equilibrium profits because the latter 
positively depends on the incumbent's profits,
Therefore, apart from the usual business-stealing 
effect, the entrant's market share has also a positive 
effect on the network owner's.
The game consists of two stages. At the first stage, 
M sets p, which determines the density D. Secondly, 
firms compete setting retail prices (rM, rE) simulta-
neously. We solve the resulting game by backward 
induction to characterize the corresponding Subga-
me Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). Without loss of 
generality, M is always the firm on the left and E is 
the firm on the right. We assume that the two firms 
provide services which correspond to the extremes 
of the segment [0,1] along which consumers' ideal 
type of service are distributed. We do not rule out the 
possibility of α≤k . Thus, the cost k borne by M may 
not be fully covered by the entrant's connection fee 
or may be just equal to it. Although this would not 
be what one would expect in the case of monopolist's 
decision on α, it could correspond to the regulator's 
decision to subsidize the entrant or only partially 
compensate M for the costs incurred to maintain the 
network infrastructure.
For a given pair of retail prices ( rM ,rE ) the indifferent 
consumer' between the two types of service offered 






yielding service demands dM=D·x and dE=D·(1-x) for 
the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. Then, at 
the second stage firm M and E maximize,
πM=(p-k)dM+(p+α-k)dE+(rM-cM)dM ,  (2)
and
πE=(rE-cE-α)dE ,
respectively. It is important to note that the access 
tariff p paid by customers served by E is transferred 
through the entrant to the network owner, so that the 
entrant's profits are not affected directly by it. The 
resulting equilibrium yields the following proposi-
tion,
Proposition 2: When the service is provided by a 
duopoly consisting of the network owner M and an 
entrant E who is asked to pay a connection fee α to 
the former, an access price of
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We first observe that network capacity D*> Dˆ  (the 
inverse order holds for access prices p) if 2(1+k-α)>t. 
Accordingly, liberalization of service provision provi-
des maximal network capacity only when the regula-
tor decrease α or, alternatively, when transportation 
costs t is high enough.
Moreover, a further inspection of retail prices give us 
information on the impact of liberalization on consu-
mer surplus and social welfare. We find that ii rr ˆ
* >  as 
long as t< 4 (R-α-c). Then, when the regulator fixes 
the connection fee α large enough, network capacity 
is reduced, but it is offered at the lowest retail prices. 
If the regulator gives to firm M the capacity to choose 
α, and the aim of the regulator is to provide maximal 
network capacity, it is at the cost of high retail prices. 
Remark: The relevant issue for policy makers are the 
appropriate level of, (i) network capacity, and (ii) retail 
prices. As we have pointed out, this is not trivial becau-
se there is a trade off between capacity and retail prices 
of the service, especially when consumers’ affordability 
is reduced.
Social welfare considerations
In this framework, social welfare analysis becomes 
both relatively straightforward and insightful. Let us 
recall that the case of monopoly under the assump-
tion of universal service provision (or full market 
coverage) achieves the maximum level of social 
welfare that can be reached by a single provider of the 
service. This is given by:
SWM=R-k-cM-2 ſ01/2  t/12=R-k-cM-t
We use this case as a benchmark to assess the effects 
of liberalization on overall market efficiency. By 
observation of the above expression of social welfare, 
given a specific market structure, there are two sour-
ces of possible inefficiencies: first, deviations from 
the maximal network density resulting from access 
capacity prices p>0; and second, inefficient splits of 
the market between the two suppliers. Regarding 
this last source of inefficiency, consider the case 
of equal service provision marginal costs cM=cE=c. 
Then, if firms are symmetrically located with respect 
to the consumers' unit length segment the efficient 
market split is one in which consumers are equally 
shared between the two suppliers. As the indifferent 
which is always positive for all parameter values, 
contrary to the property obtained by De Bijl and Peitz 
(2006) in a similar setting where    .The 
higher the participation of M in E's profits, the less are 
the entrant's incentives to undercut prices in order 
to steal business from the incumbent. Moreover, if 
the aim of the regulator is to maximize density and 
give incentives to new competitors to enter into the 
market regardless the level of retail prices, an increase 
in α is a right measure. Finally, total transportation 
costs are equal to those of the monopoly case above. 
However, a source of inefficiency identified here 
relates to the network owner's reduced incentives to 
encourage installation of maximal network capacity, 
because the entrant will now enjoy part of the bene-
fits from a high network capacity.
Discussion: service quality, retail prices, and 
social welfare considerations.
Here, we report the main results that arise from each 
market environment in order to highlight the effects 
of the interaction between marker structure, compe-
tition and regulation. For simplicity of the discussion, 
we assume that both firms have the same marginal 
cost at the service provision stage cM=cE=c. 
Service quality and retail prices
Thus, we pay attention to the level of p (then D), rI and 
α as a function of the structural parameters t,k. Table 
3 reports equilibrium magnitudes of the variables.
TABLE 3. Market results by type of environment
12
5
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are charged a connection fee per service unit they 
provide to their clients14.In both environments, the 
network monopolist and the entrant are assumed 
to have market power and compete in retail prices 
in the service provision stage15.Under this simple 
framework of one-way access, unbundling the local 
loop seems the right measure in order to enhance 
competition when new entrants offer broadband 
Internet access by using ’digital subscriber line' (DSL) 
technology. Moreover, as voice telephony can be 
alternatively implemented by using Voice Internet 
protocol (VoIP), local loop unbundling may also 
enhance competition in the voice telephone market. 
It is also important to understand local loop unbun-
dling regulation within the general framework of 
liberalization of telecommunications markets. In 
the case of broadband for data, regulators should 
ask themselves whether consumers wish to have fast 
broadband connections that can increasingly be used 
for hi-tech services or, in the other hand, there is 
perhaps little need for such advanced products, and 
consumers care more for decent speed at a reasonably 
lower price. If the answer to the first question is affir-
mative, regulation of the local loop should encourage 
full unbundling and line sharing and discourage 
bit stream and simple resale access (i.e. by allowing 
higher retail prices). However, if the answers are 
in the opposite directions, then regulation should 
respond accordingly, making bit stream access and 
simple resale access (i.e. the connection fee).




15 Future research will include an extended model of 
competition to measure the impact of global competition on 
broadband Internet access. Such a situation can be modelled by 
supposing an oligopoly market which includes a competitive 
fringe. Another possibility is to consider a Stackelberg sequential 
market where some firms are leaders and another group of firms 
plays the role of followers.
consumer is located at ½, with  cM≠cE, the desirable 
condition is that the more efficient supplier serves 
more consumers than the inefficient one up to the 
point at which the extra travelling cost paid by clients 
served along a broader market segment, equals the 
efficiency gains from being supplied by the efficient 
provider, as the expression below shows,
Finally, the general conclusion drawn from our analy-
sis is that competition may increase the consumer's 
surplus, but does not necessarily enhance social 
welfare. Duopoly is more efficient than the monopoly 
case depending on the aim of the regulatory autho-
rity. In general, duopoly leads to further efficiency 
losses due to the incentives for the network owner to 
restrict output in the capacity provision stage.
Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the impact of ICT on 
different economic aspects of developing societies. 
Broadband subscribers are likely to grow even during 
the global economic downturn, albeit at a much 
slower rate than previous years13. As demand for 
Internet services is growing both in urban and rural 
areas, an important decision for governments and 
regulators is whether to provide universal service at 
low navigation speed or to provide urban populations 
and consumers located near large cities a high speed 
connection (with possibly rising prices). Moreover, 
the decision to introduce competition in the servi-
ce provision market may mean that the incumbent 
decides to vary the network capacity and the connec-
tion fees to reach network facilities, with potential 
customer welfare losses. In particular, we have shown 
that liberalization seems to have different impacts on 
consumer surplus and on consumer welfare. 
Our analysis has focused on the fact that a network 
which is used to provide a service may be accessed 
by consumers whose connection capacity determi-
nes the quality of their service and also the market 
size. In our analysis, the network owner (incum-
bent operator) participates in the service provision 
market. In our benchmark model, the network 
owner also provides Internet access to a population 
of consumers. In the liberalized model, new entrants 
13 See for example, http://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats.htm (18/12/2009).
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Appendix 
Proof of proposition 1
From the monopolist’s profit function 
πM(p,rM)=(1-p)[(p-k)+(rM-cM)], 
behaviour at third stage is defined by the condition 
 = 1-p>0.
This partial derivative is always positive for all p. 
Under the assumption of universal service provision 
and that the monopolist has no incentive to locate 
outside the unit interval,    and           . 
Utility for consumers located at the extremes is equal 
to zero (as a result of profit maximization behaviour) 
then,            , or  as x={0,1}, respectively. 
Then, rM=R-p-  . At the second stage, by substituting 
in lM we find that l*M=1/2. Finally, at the first stage 
by substitution of  and   in the monopolist’s profit 
function, 
πM(p,rM)=(1-p)[(p-k)+(R-p-   -CM)
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with first order condition,
 =-R+(k+   +CM).
The above expression must be negative in order to 
get positive profits. Then p*=0, and rM=R-t/4. This 
completes the proof.
Proof of proposition 2
At second stage M and E set retail prices which in 
equilibrium satisfy,
 =(1-p)  = 0, i, j = M, E, and i ≠ j.
Solving the system of equations a equilibrium in 
retail prices is found. By substitution on the profits 
functions and by derivation with respect to p on M 
profits, the equilibrium value reported for p (thus D) 
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